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Abstract—We investigate the feasibility of using a classifier for
security-related requirements trained on requirement specifica-
tions available online. This is helpful in case different requirement
types are not differentiated in a large existing requirement
specification. Our work is motivated by the need to identify
security requirements for the creation of security assurance
cases that become a necessity for many organisations with new
and upcoming standards like GDPR and HiPAA. We base our
investigation on ten requirement specifications, randomly selected
from a Google Search and partially pre-labelled. To validate the
model, we run a 10-fold cross-validation on the data where each
specification constitutes a group.
Our results indicate the feasibility of training a model from
a heterogeneous data set including specifications from multiple
domains and in different styles. However, performance benefits
from revising the pre-labelled data for consistency. Additionally,
we show that classifiers trained only on a specific specification
type fare worse and that the way requirements are written has
no impact on classifier accuracy.
Index Terms—Security, Assurance, Requirement, Classifica-
tion, Machine-learning, Case, Evidence, Claim, Argument
I. INTRODUCTION
Assurance Cases are documented bodies of evidence used
to reason about certain properties of a system [1]. Such cases
have been widely used in safety-critical domains such as
automotive, aviation, and medical devices as a framework
for safety assurance. Using assurance cases for security is a
relatively new development which is quickly gaining a foothold.
One reason for this is that cyber-security has been gaining
attention in the past few years in safety-critical domains. In
the automotive domain for instance, manufacturers started to
increase their security efforts when two hackers succeeded
to remotely hack a Jeep Cherokee and were able to control
essential parts of the vehicle such as the steering wheel [2].
Such unauthorised access compromises the safety of the
vehicle’s passengers as well as that of other vehicles on the
road. Authorities are also acting to make cyber-security an area
of focus when it comes to safety-critical systems. The new ISO
standard 21434 [3], e.g., states that car manufacturers must
provide structured argumentation and evidence for their claims
regarding the security of their systems. This will happen in the
form of security assurance cases (SAC), following an approach
similar to the one long practiced in the area of safety.
SAC will not only be created for new projects, but will
also need to be prepared retrospectively for existing systems.
As an assurance case always starts with a set of relevant
requirements, it will be necessary to identify all security-related
requirements for such systems. A typical safety-critical system
such as a vehicle, an aircraft, or an insulin pump can be based
on requirement specifications with thousands of requirements
spread over several documents [4], [5]. In many cases, security-
related requirements are not marked as such and thus a manual
search is necessary, incurring a potentially very high cost for
identifying them manually.
The alternative is that companies mine large amounts of data
in different repositories to find security-related requirements
that can be used as claims in SACs in an automated way.
Machine learning approaches and in particular classifiers can
support such a task, but require a robust training set in order
to be able to classify security-related requirements with high
accuracy. Constructing such a training set manually can again
incur high cost.
In this paper, we investigate the usefulness of training a
classifier on existing, labelled projects freely available on
the internet. If such a classifier provides sufficient accuracy,
companies will be able to save significant effort and time. These
cost reductions depend on the quality of the classification, the
manual effort required to find suitable projects for learning,
and how closely the classification results need to be checked
and revised. Our first research question is thus:
RQ1: Which performance can a classifier for security-related
requirements achieve if it is trained on data from other projects?
While it is desirable that practitioners can use training data
without much additional effort, previous work shows that
classification of security requirements [6] or non-functional
requirements in general [7] is difficult across projects. We thus
also explored the impact of the structure of the requirements
and the specification types. Our second research question is
therefore:
RQ2: Which impact do factors such as the structure of the
requirements and the type of requirement specification have
on classifier performance?
We answer these research questions by performing a 10-fold
cross-validation with ten different requirements specifications
mined from the Internet where each of the specifications forms
one group. We also manually improve the labelling of the
requirement specifications and explore different modifications
to this general setup.
Our results show that performance of a classifier trained
on nine of the specifications and applied to the remaining
one can be very good, but that caveats apply with regard to
the data quality of the training data. We thus also consider
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performance of the classifier when the training set has been
revised manually. We find that the structure of the requirements
and the type of the specification play little role and that, on
the contrary, heterogeneous training data is preferable. Based
on these findings, we make suggestions for how to apply the
approach in practice and discuss its limitations.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Security-related Requirements
Cyber-security (referred to simply as security in the remain-
der of this article) in general is defined as:
“The approach and actions associated with security
risk management processes followed by organizations and
states to protect confidentiality, integrity and availability
of data and assets used in cyber space. The concept
includes guidelines, policies and collections of safeguards,
technologies, tools and training to provide the best
protection for the state of the cyber environment and
its users." (Scatz et al. [8])
The triad confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) is
considered to represent the important security properties [9].
The requirements that directly target one of these properties
are security requirements. Additionally, the requirements to
comply with a certain security regulation, standard, or best
practice, e.g., ISO 27001 [10] are also counted as security
requirements. One challenge of requirements engineering for
security is that requirement engineers often lack expertise
in security [5]. Hence they might not be able to correctly
tag security requirements in case they are not explicit. The
motivation for this study is to support constructing security
arguments for security assurance cases. Hence we are interested
in identifying not only direct security requirements, but also
ones that relate to CIA, such as the creation of a log to keep
track of a user’s actions. We consider these to be security-
related requirements. All security requirements are thus also
security-related.
B. Security Assurance Cases
Assurance Cases (AC) are defined as “A reasoned and
compelling argument, supported by a body of evidence, that a
system, service or organisation will operate as intended for a
defined application in a defined environment.” by GSN [11]. A
security assurance case (SAC) is a special type of an AC where
security is the quality property of focus [12], [13]. An SAC
consists of two main parts: the argument and the evidence, as
shown in Figure 1. The figure also shows the main elements of
an SAC: the (i) claim, which represents a security goal of the
artefact for which the SAC is built; the (ii) context, in which
the claims apply; the (iii) strategy, which is the driver for
breaking down a claim into sub-claims; the (iv) assumptions,
in which the assumptions made while creating the argument
are made explicit; and the (v) evidence, which is an artifact
that justifies a certain claim.
There are multiple options for approaching the creation of
an SAC argument. One common approach is to use security
requirements as the starting point [14], [15], [16]. An example
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Fig. 1. Structure of a Security Assurance Case
is shown in Figure 1. To ensure the completeness of the case,
all relevant security-related requirements have to be addressed.
Not meeting that criterion negatively impacts the quality of
the case. Hence, it is important to identify explicit security
requirements as well as security-related requirements in a given
requirements specifications document.
C. Automatic Classification Tasks
Automatic classification tasks address the problem of ar-
ranging data into groups or classes. There are two main
types of classifiers problems: binary (when we only have two
classes), and multi-class (when we have more than two classes).
Classifiers learn from data sets which are usually called training
sets. A classifier extracts features from the training sets that it
uses two differentiate the classes. There are two main types of
learning: supervised, and un-supervised. Supervised learning,
which is used in this study, uses a labelled training set that
contains examples for each class. The classifier uses a Machine
Learning (ML) algorithm to learn patterns based on the features
from the training set which allows it to predict the label of
unlabelled data (often referred to as test data) [17].
D. Related Work
1) Support for SAC construction: Machine learning has not
been used for constructing security assurance cases before.
However, some studies have focused on how to extract relevant
information for constructing SACs from different sources such
as document repositories and models.
Chindamaikul et al. [18] conducted a study which resulted in
an approach to extract information from a large data set using
document retrieval and formal concept analysis techniques. In
contrast our study in which users get relevance-predictions for
a set of requirements, Chindamaikul et al. [18] suggest that
the user writes a query with the desired keywords and gets
the relevant documents back. Hawkins et al. [19] explore the
possibility for a model-based approach to construct SAC based
on information extracted from models. Shrott and Weber [20]
created a tool for dynamically analyzing code coverage for
SAC evidence creation. Tippenhauer et al. [21] suggest an
approach for automatically creating security argument graphs.
The approach takes different documents as input, such as
security goals, attacker model, and system description. However,
there is no discussion on how to extract security-related data
from a more generic document such as a system description.
2) Classification of requirements: Automatic classifica-
tion and categorization of requirements has been explored
in multiple studies. Researchers have suggested approaches
for classifying functional requirements in order to analyse
customers’ requirements [22] and to classify requirements
documents into content topics in order to assist reviewers
from certification authorities in finding inconsistencies [23].
Classifying security requirements has also been reported in
literature. It was however targeting other goals than supporting
the creation of SAC. Knauss et al. [6] approach the problem
that security issues are ignored early in software projects by
creating an early indication of security issues based on security
requirements. The approach uses a classifier to classify security
related requirements. The researchers evaluate the approach
by using three requirement specifications from industry with a
total of 510 requirements, of which 187 are security related.
The paper also tests transferability of a model trained on two
specifications to the third. The results showed an F1measure
below 50% in these cases, while a cross validation on the
whole data set gave an average 1measure of 84%.
Kutranovic et al. [7] also study the classification of re-
quirements, but into different classes, namely functional,
and non-functional. The researchers also study a multi-class
classification of the non-functional requirements. One of these
classes is security. The data which Kutranovic et al. used
was from the RE17 conference data challenge. The results of
security requirements classification show an F1_measure of
74%. A similar study to classify non-functional requirements
is done by Cleland-Huang et at. [24]. The data was collected
from 15 projects with a total of 684 requirements, of which
326 are non-functional. The results show an average recall of
around 70%. However, the score for security requirements was
below that average.
In our study, we use a heterogeneous dataset with signifi-
cantly more requirements than the related work, as our aim is
study the possibility of cross-project training and prediction.
We also discuss patterns in which the classifier fails to predict
correctly.
III. METHOD
We followed a three-phased iterative approach as shown
in Figure 2 to answer our research questions. We chose this
problem-solving paradigm since it allows us to create and apply
artefacts in an iterative manner with design and validation
delivering insights that can be used for improvement in the
next iteration.
A. Phase 1
In this phase, we focused on building the data set for this
study, preparing it for training the classifier, and building and
training a first version of the classifier. We describe the steps
we performed in this phase in the following subsections.
1) Data Gathering: We identified ten different requirement
specifications from commercial projects, student projects, and
research projects with a total of 3003 requirements for use in
this study. The data set was collected by performing a Google
search. Our goal was to obtain data that was as heterogeneous
as possible. Hence, we did not want to restrict the search on a
specific domain or a specific type of requirement specifications.
The only restriction we had was on the file type, as we were
only interested in file types from which we can easily extract
the data. The search string we used was:
requirements specifications filetype:xls
OR xlsx OR pdf
We went through the results and excluded files from which
extraction of data was not possible, e.g., due to access
restrictions or non-English text. We then selected the first
ten files that fit our criteria for inclusion in our data set.
Table I shows information about the requirement specifica-
tions from which we collected our data. As the table indicates,
the documents are from different projects and contain different
numbers of requirements. Some of the documents stem from
commercial projects, one has been created by researchers,
and yet others have been created by students in university
projects.There is also a difference in the specification type,
as in some cases they are System Requirement Specifications
(SRS), and in other cases they are Requests for Proposals
(RFP), or items of the Backlogs (BL) of certain products. The
requirements in different documents are written on different
levels, e.g., domain level, user level, and system level. Hence,
there are different levels of details in the requirements,
which makes the length (number of words) vary significantly
among them. Figure 3 shows the minimum, maximum, and
average number of words per requirement for each of the 10
projects. As can be seen from the figure, all projects have
very short requirements (less than 10 words). However when
it comes to the average, the range is between 11 and 34
words. The difference is even bigger when we look at the
longest requirements which vary between 39 and 181 words.
Additionally, the different documents contain requirements
written in different styles. Some are written as user stories,
some as instructions to potential vendors, and others in a
conversational language style.
2) Labelling: In Phase 1, we manually assigned labels
to the requirement specifications that contained no labelling
or only a partial labelling as we were planning to use a
supervised learning algorithm which requires labelled data.
We differentiate two classes for the labelling: (i) security
requirements are the positive class; (ii) all other requirements
are the negative class. We consider all requirements that address
security properties of a system to be security requirements.
This includes but is not limited to requirements for access
control, data confidentiality, system availability, data integrity,
and logging.
Many of the requirements documents used in this study had
labelled requirements. How requirements were labelled differed
between the specifications. In some cases, different types of
requirements were in separate sheets, in others tags were used.
We unified the representation when preparing our data files.
However, half of the labelled documents did not have specific
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Fig. 2. The three-phased methodology we followed to design and validate the cross-project classification of security requirements.
TABLE I
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY.
Specification Total number of Security requirements
Spec Project Project type type requirements Phase 1 Phase 2 Pre-labeled
1 Mobile application for restaurants Student project SRS 98 20 18 Yes
2 University inventory management Student project SRS 27 9 11 Yes
3 Financial management system Commercial project RFP 180 110 103 Partially
4 Research data management system Commercial project SRS 92 8 9 Partially
5 Software development platform Research project BL 567 68 104 Partially
6 Financial management system Commercial project RFP 171 41 41 No
7 Financial management system Commercial project RFP 995 5 179 Partially
8 Customer relation management system Commercial project RFP 127 25 38 Yes
9 Electronic document management system Commercial project BL 253 22 34 No
10 Human resources management system Commercial project RFP 493 70 57 Yes
Total 3,003 378 594
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 Spec. 10
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Fig. 3. Number of words in the requirements per specification
labels for security, but rather a label to indicate non-functional
or quality requirements (marked as Partially labelled in Table I).
Hence, we performed manual labelling for such specifications.
The complexity of this task varied depending on the project
and how the requirements are written. This is due to the fact
that some requirements were written as functional requirements
but contained implicit security requirements. An example of
such a requirement is:
“The system shall provide the ability for an authorized
user to reissue a payment according to configurable
business rules e.g., supervisor approval"
(Specification 7)
This requirement is functional but also restricts access to a
function to authorized users, which makes it a security-related
requirement. To determine to which class such requirements
belong, we followed these steps:
• Extract the security-related part of the requirement (in
our example case that would be restricting access to the
functionality of reissuing a payment to authorized users).
• Search the document for a different requirement which
covers the extracted security-related part.
If found, we consider the original requirement to be not
security-related. In this study, this was rarely the case.
Else, we consider the original requirement to be security-
related and label it correspondingly.
3) Data Pre-Processing: To prepare data for the classifier,
we pre-processed the requirements specifications following
standard procedures for machine learning. We used the machine
learning library scikit-learn [25] for the entire study.
Remove noise: We removed punctuation and special charac-
ters by defining regular expressions using the re library
in python, and applying them on the data.
Extract words: Since the requirements are written in a natural
language, the words are separated with spaces. Hence,
we considered every sequence of characters between two
spaces to be a word.
Ignore case: Since case sensitivity is not important in our
problem, we converted all words to lower case.
Remove stop words: Stop words refer to the most commonly
used terms in a language. These words usually appear in
most sentences and thus do not contribute to classifying
the requirement. We used the pre-defined English stop
words list in scikit-learn.
Stemming: To ensure that words that stem to the same root,
e.g., “authorization” and “authorize”, are treated the same
way, we used the library PorterStemmer in scikit-learn to
perform the stemming task.
4) Feature extraction: In this study we use the Bag of
Words (BOW) representation of features, where each word of
the textual corpus is considered a feature. In particular, we
used TF-IDF (Term Frequency-Inverted Document Frequency)
which is a statistical measure that reflects how important a
specific term is in a given corpus [26]. Term frequency gives
weight to a term that appears frequently in a given document
(requirement in our case):
TF (t) =
Number of times term t appears in a requirement
Total numbers of terms in the requirement
(1)
Inverted document frequency gives weight to terms that are
rare in the documents.
IDF (t) = loge(
Total number of requirements
Number of requirements that include t
)
(2)
In our case, we expect the terms relevant to the positive
class to be rare among all the requirements as the positive
class is significantly smaller than the negative one. Hence, we
expect TF-IDF to have good performance.
The final score is the multiplication of the two values:
TF − IDFscore = TF ∗ IDF (3)
5) Up-sampling: Since we had significantly more non-
security requirements than security ones in the data set, we
used an up-sampling technique to achieve balanced classes
in the training set for the machine learning model. After
splitting the data into training and test sets, we applied the
Synthetic Minority Oversampling (SMOTE) technique [27]
on our training set. Rather than replicating the minority
observations, SMOTE creates synthetic records based on the
existing minority records.
6) Selection of Classification Algorithm: Our problem is a
binary classification to predict whether a textual requirement
belongs to the positive class (security-related requirement),
or the negative class (non-security related requirement). The
selection of the algorithm was based on an initial test to
compare the algorithms on our data set. We tested three of
the most commonly used algorithms for text classification:
Random Forest (RT) [28], Linear Support Vector Machine
(Linear SVM) [29], and Naive Bayes (NB) [30]. The results
of this test showed a slight advantage of RT, so we decided to
use it for this study.
B. Phase 2
In this phase, we focused on enhancing the results from the
previous phase and extracting information that could help us to
build better classifiers in the future. We started by diagnosing
the reasons for the underwhelming results of Phase 1, especially
in the cross-project validation step.
1) Quality assurance of labeling: A significant issue we
identified were incorrectly pre-labelled requirements. We thus
decided to revise the labelling of all 3003 requirements in
the data set. The most common modification of the original
labelling was to move requirements from the negative class to
the positive class by applying the decision procedure described
in Section III-A2. As a result, the number of security related
requirements increased from 378 to 594. Table I shows the
changes in the number of security requirements from Phase 1
to Phase 2.
For some specifications, the number of security requirements
in a certain specification decreased during the quality check.
This happened when security-related requirements (e.g., to
create audit logs in specification 10) were followed by refined
requirements (e.g., on what the logs should look like and how
they should be sorted). The pre-labelled data marked all of
these as security-related, while our labelling removed the label
from the follow-up requirements.
2) Improving model hyper-parameters: The results of the
cross-project validation suggest that we might have an over-
fitting issue. To eliminate that risk, we tuned the following
hyper-parameters of the random forest algorithm:
(i) n_estimator indicates the number of trees in the model
(the more trees, the lower the risk of over-fitting);
(ii) max_features defines how many features each tree in the
ensemble is randomly assigned; and
(iii) max_depth specifies the maximum depth of each tree.
(iv) bootstrap indicates whether the whole dataset will be
used for building trees, or only bootstrap samples of the
data.
We used scikit-learn’s RandomSearchCV function which
performs a random search of the hyper-parameters and performs
k-fold cross-validation for each set of parameters. The random
search was performed for 100 iterations and results were
evaluated with a three-fold cross-validation.
3) Feature extraction: In this step, we were interested
in extracting the most important features that the classifier
used. This information gave insights into how the clas-
sifier interpreted the different specifications. We used the
feature_importances_ attribute returned by the clas-
sifier after the training. This list returns the features ordered by
importance, which is represented by a value. The sum of the
importance of all features sum to 1. When represented in this
study, we multiply the importance values by 100 to present a
percentage of the overall importance.
C. Phase 3
In order to better understand the results from phases 1 and 2,
we added a third phase in which we ran specific experiments
on the data, in particular to investigate the impact of certain
optimisations. In particular, we were interested in the following
questions:
• Which impact does the optimisation of the hyper-
parameters have on the results?
• Can an extended list of stop words improve the results?
• Which impact do the different specification types have?
To answer these questions, we retrained and reclassified our
data with different combinations of specifications and with
different parameters.
To answer the first question, we treated the hyper-parameters
as an independent variable, and created two treatments, one
using the default values of the hyper-parameters (used in Phase
1) and the second using the values of the parameters which we
got from the random search cross-validation (used in Phase
2). We again ran the experiment as a 10-fold cross-project
validation and used the labelling from Phase 2. The dependent
variables used were the accuracy, precision, and recall of the
classification. We report the results as the difference between
the treatments for each of our dependent variables, in each
fold, and calculate the averages.
To answer the second question, we added terms which
often appear in requirements, such as user, shall, and vendor
to the stop-word list and checked if this would improve
the classification results. We used the stop-word list as our
only independent variable in this experiment. We created two
treatments, one using the default English language stop-words
list used in phases 1 and 2 and another using an extension to
that list by the three mentioned terms. We ran the experiment
as a 10-fold cross-validation. We used the labelling from Phase
2. The dependent variables used were the accuracy, precision,
and recall of the classification. We report the results as the
difference between treatment one and two for each of our
dependent variables in each fold and calculate the averages.
To investigate the last question, we hypothesised that the
structure of the requirements does not make a significant
difference to the classifier. To test that, we conducted an
experiment with one independent variable, which is the dataset
used for classification. We created two treatments, one using the
dataset from Phase 2, and another using the subset that contains
only requirements from specifications with specification type
RFP (five specifications). We ran the experiment as a 5-
fold cross-validation. The dependent variables used were the
accuracy, precision, and recall of the classification. We report
the results as the values of the dependent variables for each
project, and discuss the difference to the results of Phase 2.
D. Threats to validity
In terms of internal validity, we consider the data labelling
and the selection of the algorithm.
We labelled the data set at two different points in time:
once before Phase 1 for the unlabelled specifications; and
once in Phase 2 for the whole data set. The labelling was
done by one person, hence there is the risk that judgement
was subjective. To mitigate this risk, an additional person was
asked to label a sample of the data. An agreement analysis
using Cohen’s Kappa [31] showed an agreement of over 80%
which is considered a good agreement value [32], [33].
The selection of the RF algorithm was based on a preliminary
run which compared three algorithms. There is a possibility that
another algorithm had performed better if the data cleaning and
hyper-parameters tuning had been performed before comparing.
We also did not test other feature extraction models than BOW.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF VALIDATION USING THE FULL DATA SET AND AN 80/20 SPLIT.
f-measures
Phase Accuracy Precision Recall f1 f1/2 f2
1 94.9 93 58.8 72.1 83 62.7
2 94.5 87.6 80.2 83.7 86 81.6
However, the purpose of this study was not to find an optimal
approach, but rather to investigate if cross-project validation
was feasible.
In terms of external validity, we consider overfitting and
imbalanced data sets.
Overfitting is a common problem in machine learning [34].
It causes the classifier to perform very good during training and
optimization, but very poorly when applied. To avoid this issue,
we performed a hyper-parameter tuning with a cross-validation
random search with 300 fits in Phase 2.
We used oversampling to tackle the issue of imbalanced data
sets. This might have increased the likelihood of overfitting
according to Sotiris et al. [35]. To reduce this risk, we used the
synthetic minority oversampling technique rather than random
oversampling and applied it after splitting the data set into
training and testing data.
IV. RESULTS
A. Validation – Phase 1
We performed an initial validation of the classification
approach by using a standard 80/20 split. This means that
we split the data randomly into a training set (80% of the data)
and a testing set (20% of the data). Table II shows the results
of the test. We obtained an average accuracy of 94.9. However,
since the negative class dominates with almost 76% of the
data not related to security, this measure is not a sufficient
indicator of quality. Hence, we also looked at the precision
and recall of the results. While precision is generally good
at 93 (i.e., few requirements are marked as security-related
even if they are not), recall is low at 58.8 (i.e., many security-
related requirements are not found). While these results were
not stellar, they showed at least that our dataset was viable.
Additionally, we report three different f-measures: the F1-
score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall; in the
F0.5-score, precision is given double the weight of recall; and
the F2-score weighs recall higher than precision. Which of these
scores is suitable depends on the situation. If false negatives
are to be avoided, a focus on recall and thus the F2 score is
a good choice; if false positives are to be avoided, the focus
should be on precision and thus the F0.5 score.
The next step was to test the quality of the classifier when
performing cross-project classification. For this purpose, we
used 10-fold-cross-validation, with each requirement specifica-
tion being one group. We thus trained the classifier on nine of
the specifications and tested it on the tenth. This was run ten
times so that all combinations were explored.
The results of this experiment are shown in Table III. While
some requirement specifications showed good accuracy and
TABLE III
CROSS-PROJECT VALIDATION RESULTS OF PHASE 1. OUTLIERS ARE
MARKED IN BOLD FACE.
f-measures
Spec. Accuracy Precision Recall F1 F1/2 F2
1 91.8 91.7 61.1 73.3 83.4 65.5
2 92.6 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9
3 64.4 76 55.4 64 70.7 58.6
4 92.4 66.7 44.4 53.3 60.6 47.6
5 84.1 45.4 54.3 49.4 46.9 52.3
6 89.5 81.8 69.2 75 78.9 71.4
7 90.7 77.9 62 72.1 74.1 64.6
8 83.5 77.8 45.2 57.1 68 49.3
9 94.5 75 75 75 75 75
10 92.1 89.7 50 64.2 77.4 54.9
∅ 87.56 77.09 60.55 67.23 72.39 62.81
precision, recall was generally low and there were significant
outliers (marked in bold face) in the table.
B. Validation – Phase 2
When investigating these outliers, we realized that the
labelling of data was inconsistent in the data set. Since we
are using multiple requirements specifications documents from
multiple sources labelled by different people with different
standards, such inconsistencies might be unavoidable. An
example is when requirements related to logging user actions
were considered as security requirements in some projects, but
not in others. This influences the accuracy since the classifier
might label a requirement about logging user actions as security-
related, but the ground truth shows it is not.
In order to address such issues, we revised the labelling of the
requirements specifications. In specification 5, e.g., one of the
outliers in Phase 1, the number of security-related requirements
increased from 68 to 104, an increase of more than 50%. This
not only changes the outcomes when specification 5 is used
to validate the classifier, but also has an influence on other
projects when specification 5 is included in the training data.
In addition, we optimised the hyper-parameters of the
Random Forest classifier. As described in Section III, a few
key parameters determine the performance of the classifier. For
a detailed discussion of the impact of hyper-parameter tuning
on the performance of the classifier, please see Section IV-C1.
The values of the key hyper-parameters as per the results of
the cross-validation random search are:
• n_estimators=400, which is an increase from the default
value 100 used in the first phase;
• max_features=’sqrt’, which tells the classifier to use the
square root of the number of features when looking for
the best split. This value is the same as the default value
auto;
• max_depth = None, which is the same as the default value;
• bootstrap=False, which means that the whole dataset
would be used to build each tree. This differs from
the default value where bootstrap samples are used for
building the trees.
TABLE IV
CROSS-PROJECT VALIDATION RESULTS OF PHASE 2
f-measures
Spec. Accuracy Precision Recall F1 F1/2 F2
1 94.9 93.9 77.8 84.8 90.2 80.6
2 92.6 90.1 90.1 90.1 90.1 90.1
3 83.3 96.1 73 82.9 90.3 76.7
4 96.7 85.7 77.8 82.3 84 79.2
5 92.4 86.8 69.2 77 82.6 72.1
6 91.2 88.2 73.2 80 84.7 75.8
7 94.3 82.5 86.6 84.5 83.2 85.7
8 92.9 100 76.3 86.6 94.2 80.1
9 95.7 92.6 73.5 82 88 76.7
10 95.7 91.9 65.4 76.4 85 69.4
∅ 89.6 90.8 76.3 82.7 87.4 78.8
TABLE V
CHANGES IN QUALITY METRICS WHEN TUNING THE HYPER-PARAMETERS
FOR EACH SPECIFICATION.
Spec. Accuracy Precision Recall
1 1 1 5.6
2 0 0 0
3 3.3 3.9 3
4 1.1 1.8 11.1
5 0.4 2.8 -1
6 0.6 0.4 2.4
7 1.6 0.9 10.1
8 0.8 0 2.6
9 -0.8 -3.7 -2.9
10 0.4 -2 5.8
∅ 0.8 0.5 3.7
The final results of Phase 2 are shown in Table IV. Overall,
the results have been improved as indicated by the averages in
the last row.
C. Validation — Phase 3
We ran a serious of experiments to gain a better understand-
ing of the impact of the hyper-parameters and of different
combinations and modifications of our data.
1) Hyper-parameters tuning: The results of Phase 2 reported
above contained two improvements: the manual revision of
the data labelling and a tuning of the hyper-parameters of the
Random Forest classifier. In order to gain insight in which
of these optimisations had the bigger impact, we quantified
the changes when running the classifier with standard hyper-
parameters and with optimised parameters.
The results are shown in Table V. While the impact on
accuracy and precision is minimal, recall can be improved
significantly for some specifications. In particular, specifications
4 and 7 benefit here. While specification 4 was one of the
negative outliers in Phase 1 (cf. III) and thus had much room
for improvement, specification 7 had a better starting position
(62.0), but improved significantly to 86.6 in Phase 2. It is not
exactly clear why these specifications benefited most from the
tuned hyper-parameters and a detailed investigation is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, if recall is an issue, improving
the hyper-parameters can improve the results on average. Since
TABLE VI
THE 25 TOP-RANKED FEATURES USED BY THE CLASSIFIER WHEN TRAINED
ON DIFFERENT DATA SETS ALONG WITH THEIR IMPORTANCE. FEATURES IN
BOLD ARE NOT IN THE LIST FOR THE FULL DATA SET.
Rank Full data Spec. 3 Spec. 7
1 secur 8.7 author 9.5 secur 10.8
2 user 7.9 user 8.9 access 2.9
3 author 7.8 secur 7.9 password 2.2
4 access 4.1 access 2.7 servic 2.1
5 provid 3.7 provid 2.4 host 2
6 host 3.5 abil 1.8 user 1.9
7 servic 2.4 password 1.5 solut 1.8
8 authent 2.1 shall 1.2 provid 1.8
9 role 1.9 login 1.1 login 1.5
10 protect 1.7 role 0.9 encrypt 1.4
11 transact 1.4 log 0.9 use 1.4
12 encrypt 1.4 authent 0.9 log 1.4
13 solut 1.3 administr 0.8 authent 1.2
14 password 1.3 encrypt 0.8 author 1.2
15 abil 1.1 audit 0.7 polici 1
16 polici 1.1 polici 0.7 administr 1
17 audit 1.1 web 0.6 abil 1
18 vulner 0.8 vulner 0.6 audit 1
19 chang 0.8 base 0.6 vulner 0.9
20 administr 0.8 use 0.6 protect 0.9
21 log 0.7 configur 0.6 role 0.8
22 activ 0.7 solut 0.5 web 0.8
23 web 0.7 modifi 0.5 right 0.7
24 login 0.6 right 0.4 group 0.5
25 right 0.6 integr 0.4 manag 0.5
this step is also relatively easy and quick to do with modern
machine learning toolkits like scikit-learn, we recommend to
investigate the potential improvements with the concrete dataset
under consideration.
2) Important Features: If a classifier is robust w.r.t. different
ways of specifying requirements, it will be easier to train a
cross-project classifier. We thus set out to better understand
which impact the heterogeneity of the requirement specifica-
tions has on the classifier and thus investigated the features the
classifier uses to make a decision about the requirement. In our
case, a feature is a word stem derived from the training data and
deemed as relevant to the detection of a security requirement.
We thus expect the most relevant features to contain stems
such as “access” or “encrypt”.
The results in Table VI support this expectation. The most
important features for the full data are based on generic security
terms such as “security” and “authorize”. These terms are
indeed strong indicators for a security-related requirement.
Other, more specific terms such as “password”or “login” score
significantly lower and are less differentiating.
a) Impact of specification type: As mentioned in
Sect. III, we selected specifications independent of how they
were formulated and with a significant spread in length.
A typical requirement would, e.g., be formulated as a user story:
“As a user of a Query Broker enabler I would like
to write my own libraries for accessing the content
context data via a single unified API without taking care
about the specifics of the internal data storage and DB
TABLE VII
CROSS-PROJECT VALIDATION RESULTS OF RFP REQUIREMENTS
SPECIFICATIONS’ TYPE.
f-measures
Spec. Accuracy Precision Recall f1 f1/2 f2
3 78.9 88.8 71 78.9 84.6 74
6 91.8 86.5 78 82.1 84.7 79.6
7 87.1 75.2 42.5 54.3 65.2 46.5
8 89.8 96.3 68.4 80 89 72.6
10 93.9 78.9 57.7 66.7 73.5 61
∅ 89.62 85.14 63.52 72.4 79.7 66.9
implementations and interfaces." (Specification 5)
This requirement is functional and not labelled as security-
related. An example of a security-related requirement formu-
lated as an instruction to potential vendors is as follows:
“The Vendor shall ensure that all data at rest and in
motion is secure and encrypted in compliance with HIPAA
and applicable State law." (Specification 3)
Finally, our specifications include natural language require-
ments written in the “the system shall” style such as this
functional requirement:
“The system shall provide the ability to age and
analyze accounts payable e.g. open payables at end of
month vs normal average payable balance"
(Specification 7)
However, we did not expect the structure of the requirements
to make a significant difference to the classifier since it operates
on term frequency. Our results in Table VI confirm this to a
certain degree. The lists of features are ranked by the priority
assigned by the classifier. The terms are similar in the different
lists, but differ in priority.
To substantiate this assessment, we also ran experiments
in which we only included specifications of the same type.
Referring back to Table I, we, e.g., selected only specifications
of type Request for Proposals (RFP) and ran a k-fold cross-
validation on them. Since the data for Backlog (BL) and System
Requirement Specification (SRS) is too sparse, we only report
on RFP here.
Training only on the same type of requirement specification
does not yield better classification results. This is demonstrated
in Table VII where the quality metrics for a 5-fold cross-
validation of RFP specifications are shown. Compared with
the results of the 10-fold cross-validation in Table IV, results
have consistently decreased. This might be related to the fact
that the classifiers were trained on significantly less data. This
interpretation is supported by the negative outlier specification
7: the classifier for this specification is trained on the least
amount of requirements.
These results show that homogeneity in the training data
is not a necessity for high-quality classification, at least with
regard to the specification type. It also shows that the way the
requirements are written does not play a significant role.
b) Stop words: Table VI shows some aberrations when
considering the specific specifications. For Specification 3,
TABLE VIII
CHANGES IN QUALITY METRICS WHEN EXTENDING THE STOP WORDS LIST
WITH “USER”, “VENDOR”, AND “SHALL” FOR EACH SPECIFICATION.
Spec. Accuracy Precision Recall
1 0 0 0
2 -3.7 -0.1 -8.3
3 0.6 -2.3 3
4 0 1.8 0
5 -0.5 -5.8 3.9
6 -0.6 -2.5 0
7 -2.1 -4 -8.9
8 0 0 -2.6
9 0 0 0
10 -0.8 1.6 -9.6
∅ -0.7 -1.1 -2.3
e.g., the term “shall” is ranked on position 8. This is due
to the way the requirements are written (“the system shall”).
Another interesting term is “user”. In particular requirements
that are written as user stories might contain this term in all
requirements, not only the security-related ones. Finally, the
term “vendor” appears in some specifications, in particular
ones of the RFP type and is not exclusive to security-related
requirements there.
Excluding such terms from the classification makes the
results worse on average. Table VIII shows the results of an
experiment where we included the terms “user”, “vendor”,
and “shall” in the list of stop-words. This means that these
terms are no longer accessible to the classifier to distinguish
the two classes. While recall improved minimally for some
specifications (3 and 5), we observed either no impact (because
the words were not used in the specification) or a deterioration.
This means that these words are indeed relevant for the classifier.
At least when it comes to “user” this is also visible in the
importance that the term carries in Table VI.
c) Security mechanisms: The concrete list of features
also depends on the security mechanisms in place. The term
“password”, e.g., is included in all three lists. However, a
system does not necessarily have to be password protected.
There would be differences in the list of terms if, e.g., a
public-key infrastructure would be used. While there are no
such issues in the specifications we used, we do observe that
specific terminology, e.g., names of protocols are used without
describing that they are security related. Specification 10, e.g.,
contains the following two requirements: “The solution should
support LDAPv3” and “The solution should support Kerberos”.
The fact that LDAP and Kerberos are used for authentication
and are therefore security-related is not visible from these
descriptions. Such requirements can negatively affect recall
since they might not be picked up by a classifier who was not
trained on requirements that explicitly contained the connection
to security and thus has the respective terms in the list of
features.
A similar problem is the use of security standards by name or
reference without a description. An example is the requirement
“Hosting Service Provider will possess an ISO 27002 Certificate
of Conformance or equivalent certifications” from specification
3 and the explicit mention of HIPAA (a privacy standard for
patient data) in specifications 3 and 6. The use of security-
related terms not explicitly tied to security is also present in
specification 3 in the requirement “Solutions will have a fraud
detection function”.
d) Other misclassifications: When analysing the results
of the classification, we see several other misclassifications that
have a negative impact on precision and recall. The naming
of applications or modules in the system influences precision,
e.g., when a part of the system is called “the secure analytical
environment” as in specification 3. Every time a requirement
refers to that module, there is a chance that the classifier will
tag this as a security requirement because of the term “secure”.
Likewise, when requirements refer to security other than cyber-
security (e.g., in specifictation 10: “The system should be able
to manage and contain data on different employee categories:
Internal: Statutory SNE Interim Trainee ; External: Consultants
Security Personnel”), the requirement might be misclassified
as a security-related requirement.
Other misclassifications can be observed in cases where
requirements describe a certain aspect such as a login page and
how a user interacts with it or include a sequence of events
that includes a security-related action (e.g., “After the user
login he/she may submit a request” in specification 2). Both
of these issues affect precision since such requirements might
be falsely classified as security-related.
V. FEASIBILITY OF CROSS-PROJECT CLASSIFICATION
Our results indicate that a classifier that has been trained on
other projects can be useful for an initial classification of a
large set of requirements. However, some initial manual effort
is required to achieve sufficiently high precision and recall.
Perfect scores are unobtainable due to the inherent ambiguity
in the requirements. We discuss these aspects in the following
in order to provide guidelines for practitioners who are thinking
about labelling their requirements, e.g., in preparation for the
creation of security assurance cases.
A. Selection of training data
Suitable training data should include use of relevant security
mechanisms and standards. If the classifier is trained with train-
ing data that uses password authentication but the requirements
to be labelled do not, the risk of false negatives increases and
recall declines. Since we have randomly selected the first ten
requirement specifications we found and that adhered to our
criteria, we have presented the classifier with a worst-case
scenario.
However, in many cases the different requirement speci-
fications for a product can be heterogeneous themselves. A
vehicle, e.g., consists of many different components, developed
by different teams, vendors, and engineers from different
disciplines, using different development paradigms. Some parts
might be described as a specification handed over to a vendor
(as our specification 3), others as item definitions according
to ISO 26262 [36], and yet others as user stories that resided
in a product backlog. If this is the case, a heterogeneous
training set is an advantage since the resulting classifier can
be used to label all requirements. An alternative would be to
train separate requirements for the different types. However,
as we have shown in Section IV-C, a classifier trained only
on Request for Proposal (RFP) requirement specification fared
worse than the classifier trained on all types of specifications.
These results are a bit surprising when comparing them with
related work. Knauss et al. [6], e.g., found that when they
trained a Bayesian classifier on two different projects, it fared
poorly when applied to a third project. We hypothesise that a
certain minimal number of specifications is necessary for the
classifier to become general enough. If the classifier has been
trained on a sufficient number of variations on a certain term,
the likelihood that it will pick up a certain phrasing increases,
thus improving recall. An example from our data is the use
of the term “sensitive data” in specification 10 which is not
used in any other specification. We thus recommend to select
training data that is as heterogeneous as possible.
B. Manual Labelling
High-quality labelling of the training data has the biggest
impact on classification quality. As discussed in Section IV-B,
results improved significantly when the training data included
consistent labels for security requirements. This extra effort
needs to be weighed against the benefits. Especially in cases
where the unlabelled data set to which the classifier should be
applied is very large, investing time in labelling a comparatively
small set of training data might be significantly faster than a
full manual labelling.
In order to revise the labelling for Phase 2 of the validation,
one of the authors of this study spent approximately
15 hours on the 3003 requirements included in the ten
specifications. Overall, we estimate that the effort of
preparing the classifier, collecting publicly available data,
cleaning up the data, relabelling it, and running the
classification took approximately one entire work week for
one person. When compared to the effort that can be spent on
manually labelling reasonably large specifications, we believe-
https://www.overleaf.com/project/5e3c0ecc7896760001769b31
this to be a worthwhile investment.
C. Interpreting the results
Our original goal was to determine which performance a
classifier for security-related requirements can achieve when
trained on data from other projects (RQ1). Our results shown in
Table IV indicate that a precision above 85% can be achieved
for most specifications while recall varies significantly between
65% and 90%. These numbers were achieved after manually
revising the labelling of the training data.
We have also shown that the tuning of hyper-parameters has
an impact mostly on recall, that manipulating the stop-words
list deteriorates results, and that a more heterogeneous set of
training data is advantageous. This answers RQ2 about the
impact of different factors on classification performance.
We believe that the performance we were able to achieve
will be sufficient to support engineers in the initial labelling
of a large set of requirements, in particular if the training data
is heterogeneous enough and contains a large enough number
of security-related requirements. All of our findings indicate
that the more heterogeneity in the training data and the more
requirements in the training data, the better the performance will
be. Our findings also indicate, however, that some manual effort
is necessary to ensure the quality of the labelling in the training
data is sufficient. How much time an organisation will be
willing to invest might depend on the number of requirements
that have to be labelled — spending 15 hours on labelling 3000
requirements might be significantly less effort than manually
labelling tens of thousands of requirements.
We have also shown the limitations of automated classi-
fication. In particular, short requirements that name specific
security mechanisms, standards or unconventional technology
will be difficult to classify automatically. Likewise, architectural
elements with names that contain security related terms
or requirements that mention security-related terms without
referring to cyber-security have a negative impact on precision
and recall. We have listed a number of such examples in
Section IV-C. They are partially responsible for the numbers
that we see and are, in practice, unavoidable.
A possible extension of our approach is to use online learning
to incorporate manually curated data from the project under
investigation. This way, the initial learning on freely available
data can be complemented with parts of the project’s actual
requirement specification that have already been labelled. There
are a number of random forest variants for online learning (see,
e.g., [37], [38]) that can be used for this purpose. Alternatively,
a Bayesian classifier such as the one used by Knauss et al. [6]
can be used. Such an approach would continuously improve
predictive performance while the engineers revise the labelling
suggested by an initial classification.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown that it is feasible to train a classifier for
security-related requirements on publicly available data and
achieve a satisfactory classification performance when applying
it to a new specification after manually revising the labelling
of the training data. Our results furthermore indicate that
heterogeneity in the training data is an advantage in cross-
project classification and that interventions such as changing
the list of stop words have no positive effect on performance.
In our future work, we will use these results in the context
of security assurance cases. We will support our industrial
partners that need to construct such cases by providing our
classifier to them in order to create an initial labelling of their
requirement specifications as a foundation for defining the
claims. We will also investigate the possibility to extend our
approach towards online learning to seamlessly incorporate
parts of the requirement specifications that have already been
labelled and vetted.
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